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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 991001 -CA 
v. : 
MARKMATTICE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of attempted forgery, class A 
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient probable cause to bind defendant over on all charges of 
forgery? The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a 
question of law, [which the appellate court] review[s] . . . without deference to the court 
below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,18, 20 P.3d 300 (citation omitted). 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) is attached at Addendum A. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are determinative of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Mark Mattice, was charged with four counts of forgery (Counts I through 
IV) (R. 9-11). Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over on all 
charges (R. 38-41; 156:1-42). Defendant moved to quash the bindover of all charges (R. 69). 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion as to Count IV, taking the other counts 
under advisement (R. 15 7:1 -14). The trial court subsequently denied the motion as to Counts 
I through III (Memorandum decision, R. 108-112; Order, R. 114-15, attached at Addendum 
B). Following plea negotiations, defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of attempted 
forgery on Counts I and II, class A misdemeanors, and the trial court dismissed Counts III 
and IV (R. 126; 129-37). The trial court accepted the plea, conditioned on defendant's right 
to appeal the court's denial of defendant's motion to quash the bindover (R. 129-37). The 
trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent one year prison terms on both counts, but 
suspended the sentences and placed defendant on probation (R. 138-40). Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 141). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
At the preliminary hearing, William Dressen testified that a check numbered 7211 was 
2
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. 
C/ar£,200lUTl9at1fl9. 
2 
one of a series of checks belonging to him and his wife which were stolen from their car 
along with his wife's purse on July 24, 1998 (R. 156:3-5; State's Ex. #4).3 The check was 
made out to defendant for $2,500.00 (R. 72, 156:5-6). The signature on the check, which 
read "William Dressen," was not his signature (R. 156:3-4). Mr. Dressen did not know 
defendant, did not give him the check, and never authorized him to fill out or negotiate a 
check (R. 156:4). The Dressens notified the police that the checks had been stolen. The 
Dressens later learned that some of the stolen checks, with request for cash back, had 
unsuccessfully been deposited to their account or had been written to various businesses (R. 
156:6-7). They did not know who had taken the checks (R. 156:8). 
Officer Jennifer Smartt of the South Salt Lake City Police Department investigated 
the case and confirmed, contrary to defendant's assertion when he was interviewed, that the 
Dressens did not run a lending business (R. 156:27-29, 32). 
Jennifer Horning was assistant manager at Check City in Salt Lake City in the summer 
of 1998. On September 2,1998, defendant endorsed and then presented check #7211 to her 
for payment (R. 156:10-11,19-20). Also, between June 26,1998 and July 1,1998, defendant 
had presented three other checks for payment at Check City (R. 156:11, 16-18). These 
checks, numbered 267, 268, and 269, were made payable to defendant on the account of 
Robert and Bette Johnson, in the amounts of $225.00, $269.00, and $393.18, respectively (R. 
3
 The forgery of the check on the Dressens' account pertains to count IV (R. 10, 
11 at f 3). The forgery of the checks on the Johnsons' account, described below, pertain 
to counts 1 - III (R. 9-10, 10 at t l 1 and 2). 
3 
37, 71-72, 156:16-18; State's Ex. #1, #2, and #3). Defendant endorsed all three checks and 
had personally presented check #268 and #269 to Ms. Horning for payment (R. 71-21; 
156:11-12). Check #267 and #268 were returned to Check City for insufficient funds, and 
check #269 was returned with a stop payment order (156:12). 
Before defendant presented the check stolen from the Dressens (State's Ex. 4), Ms. 
Homing had learned that the three other checks defendant cashed at Check City had been 
stolen and forged (R. 156:14).4 Although she knew that defendant might be implicated in the 
passing of forged checks, she assisted him when she saw him enter Check City, hoping 
Check City might recover the amounts lost from the payment of the Johnsons' checks to 
defendant (R. 156:14-15). When she examined the check, she recognized that it would be 
sufficient to cover the three bad checks defendant had earlier passed, but, based on her prior 
experience, she asked defendant why the check had been issued to him (R. 156:15). 
Defendant claimed he was doing financial consulting (R. 156:15). When she called Ms. 
Dressen to verify the check, Ms. Dressen told Ms. Homing that her purse had been stolen and 
that she did not know defendant or know why a check for $2500.00 had been issued to him 
(R. 156:15). In response to Ms. Homing's inquiry, defendant claimed that a "friend" wrote 
the check to him as a loan to buy a vehicle (R. 156:15-16). Ms. Homing then gave defendant 
4
 The State presented a letter and affidavits of Betty and Robert Johnson, all dated 
July 29, 1998, which attested to the theft and forgery of the three checks purportedly 
drawn on their account (R. 37, 156:19-20; State's Ex. #5). Defendant was not charged 
with the theft of any of the four checks at issue in this case (R. 71-73). 
4 
an application, to stall him while she called the police. Defendant was arrested at Check City 
about ten minutes later as he was still filling out the application (R. 156:16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Because both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged and left 
intact case law that recognizes a guilty inference from the mere passing of a forged stolen 
check sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict, if follows, afortiorari, that the 
same quantum of evidence constitutes probable cause to bind defendant over. In any event, 
other evidence, beyond defendant's mere completing and passing forged, stolen checks, gives 
rise to a reasonable inference that defendant completed and passed the checks at issue with 
purpose to defraud. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PROOF THAT DEFENDANT PASSED A FORGED, STOLEN CHECK 
IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S BINDOVER; 
MOREOVER, HERE, THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence to support 
his bindover on four counts of forgery. Aplt. Br. at 7-15. Because his claim fails for the 
several reasons briefly discussed below, this Court should summarily affirm his convictions. 
5 
A. Controlling authority summarily disposes of defendant's 
claim that the evidence was insufficient to support bindover. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover on counts I through 
III on the authority of State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985) (recognizing the 
presumption of guilty intent to passed forged check upon unexplained fact that the defendant 
was not a rightful payee) (Memorandum Decision at R. 110). In State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT 
App. 289, 988 P.2d 949, this Court reluctantly recognized the authority of Williams in a 
forgery conviction supported only by evidence that the defendant passed a forged, stolen 
check: 
Notwithstanding the views and concerns expressed above, we are 
constrained to affirm the ruling of the trial court in the face of binding 
precedent. Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged 
instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery. See State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985). 
Id. at Tflf 13, 18 (denying motion for a directed verdict at close of the State's case-in-chief). 
By denying certiorari review of Kihlstrom, see State v. Kihlstrom, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), 
the Utah Supreme Court tacitly declined this Court's invitation to revisit Williams. Later, the 
supreme court expressly "decline[d][defendant's] invitation to reconsider Williams." See 
C/ar£, 2001 UT 9.^18 n.4. 
On the authority of Williams and Kihlstrom, both of which involved the sufficiency 
of evidence to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, it follows, a fortiori, that 
the same quantum of evidence as in those cases was sufficient to support the magistrates' 
6 
decision to bind defendant over for trial in this case, discussed in detail below.5 While citing 
Williams and Kihlstrom, see Aplt. Br. at 13-14, defendant has failed to alert this Court to 
their central holdings, which dispose of this case. Therefore, based on controlling case law, 
this Court should decline to consider defendant's claim and summarily affirm defendant's 
convictions. In any event, there was sufficient evidence to support the bindover of all 
charges, beyond facts merely showing that defendant cashed a forged, stolen check. 
B. The evidence was sufficient to bind defendant over on all charges 
under the standards articulated by the Utah Supreme Court 
/. The bindover standard 
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a 
preliminary hearing by 'presenting sufficient evidence to establish that "the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'"" Clark, 2001 UT 9 at f 10 
(quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 
7(h)(2))).6 "At this stage of the proceeding, 'the evidence required [to show probable cause] 
5
 The trial court did not simply recognize that defendant had cashed a forged, 
stolen check in denying defendant's motion to quash with respect to count IV. Rather, the 
court also particularly found facts beyond defendant's undisputed cashing of a forged, 
stolen check on which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew the check was 
not legitimate when he received it (R. 157:6, 13). Thus, the authority cited above 
necessarily applies with the same force to count IV as it does to counts I through III. 
6
 Rule 7(h)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: 
If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be 
bound over to answer in the district court. 
7 
. . . is relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get 
stronger as the investigation continues.'" Id. (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 
(Utah 1998) (citing Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229)). "Accordingly, 4[w]hen faced with 
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave 
those tasks "to the fact finder at trial.'"" Id. (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ffli 
7,3,3 P.3d 725,728 (quoting State v. Wells, 1999 UT 27, %2,977 P.2d 1192)). "Instead,'the 
magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.'" Id. (quoting Hester, 1999 UT 
27 at f 2). With the foregoing principles in mind, and after a thorough gloss of Utah case law, 
the supreme court articulated the standard for determining the required quantum of evidence 
to support a finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing stage of a prosecution: 
" [A]t . . . the preliminary hearing stage[], the prosecution must present sufficient evidence 
to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it." Id. a tf l6. 
2. There was sufficient evidence, beyond the mere fact that defendant 
cashed forged, stolen checks, to support a reasonable belief 
that defendant cashed all four checks with fraudulent intent 
Moreover, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, evidence of guilt here 
exceeds the mere cashing of a forged, stolen check. First, it is undisputed that defendant 
signed stolen checks whose makers' signatures had been forged (R. 37,71-72; 156:3-7,11-
12,19-20; State's Ex. #l-#5). As to count IV (Dressen check), defendant gave inconsistent 
8 
answers about how he had obtained the check, first telling Ms. Horning, at Check City, that 
he had been doing financial consulting, and later falsely informing Officer Smartt that the 
owner of the checks were in the lending business (R. 156:15, 27-29, 32). The trial court 
correctly recognized that a guilty intent could reasonable be inferred from these 
inconsistencies (R. 157:13-14). 
As to counts I through III, the multiplicity of checks by itself gives rise to the 
reasonable inference that defendant completed and uttered them with a purpose to defraud 
under "the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which 
eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it 
is perceived that this element cannot explain them all." 2 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 302 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1979). 
In sum, defendant's questionable representations about the check drawn on the 
Dressen's account and the cashing of multiple checks on the Johnsons' account within days 




Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request 
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (?- day of July, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were hand delivered to Catherine E. Lilly and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 




UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
( D A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
ADDENDUM B 
f u r . - • *•* 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAXB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARX R. MATTICE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE MO. 981917762 
This Court has before it the defendants Motion to Quash the 
Bindover wherein the defendant was bound over to this Court for 
trial on four counts of Forgery, third degree felonies* The matter 
was before the Court on April 30, 1999, wherein counsel for the 
State and the defendant argued their respective positions. 
At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court denied the 
defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover as to Count IV, 
determining that there was sufficient evidence for purposes of 
bindover to warrant the bindover in view of the defendant's 
statements to a witness as to an explanation as to why he had the 
check in question. 
As to Counts I, II and III, the Court took the matter under 
advisement to consider the oral arguments and to further review the 
case law cited by the parties. 
STATE V, MATTICE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The defendant urges upon this Court a conclusion that because 
the State at the preliminary hearing did not provide any evidence 
to shov that the defendant vas avare that the checks he vas 
endorsing vere forgeries, that the State had failed to make out the 
necessary elements even for the standards required for bindover. 
The evidence at the preliminary hearing shoved that the defendant 
had endorsed the three checks in question by signing his true name 
on the back of the check and presenting it for payment. The 
evidence also shoved that the checks that the defendant had vere in 
fact forgeries. There vas no direct evidence that the defendant 
vas involved in the forgery or vas avare of the forgery. The 
defendant asserts that that is a fatal flav in the State's case for 
purposes of bindover. 
The State urges in the first instance that there is no such 
Motion as a Motion to Quash a Bindover. The Court dismisses that 
argument out of hand. The appellate courts of this state have 
revieved issues vhere trial courts either have or have not granted 
Motions to Quash Bindovers and have not taken an opportunity to 
indicate that such a Motion is nonexistent or othervise 
inappropriate. In the proper case, this Court is of the opinion 
that a Motion to Quash the Bindover is an appropriate Motion, 
STATE V. MATTICE PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
although admittedly, as the State points out, the circumstances are 
rare. 
Further, the State indicates that there is an inference that 
the defendant was aware of the forgery or participated in the 
forgery based upon his presentment of the check for payment when 
there is evidence that the check was a forgery. In support of that 
proposition, the State cites a number of cases which the Court has 
now had an opportunity to review. The State's position is 
supported by decisions from the Utah Supreme Court, including ££A£& 
v. Williams, found at 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). In that case, 
Williams raised the same issue folloving a conviction for forgery 
that the defendant raises here, challenging the bindover. The 
Supreme Court noted in that case that there was evidence that the 
checks were not authorized and were forgeries, and the Supreme 
Court noted that the "defendant presented no evidence to convert 
the logical inferences which could be drawn by the jury, i.e., that 
without any explanation as to where he got the check or from whom, 
the defendant knew the check was forged.99 
That statement, as well as others by the Supreme Court, 
suggests to this Court that there is a presumption in Utah law as 
is discussed at 36 Am.Jur.2d §44, that there is an inference that 
a person who is uttering a forged document, even by endorsing the 
STATE V. MATTICE PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
forged document with one's true name, is aware that the document is 
forged. It would appear that while the cases do not suggest, and 
appropriately so, that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, 
there is an obligation on the part of the defendant to overcome the 
inference that he was aware that the checks were forged to provide 
some explanation. 
It appearing to the Court that there is an inference in Utah 
law that one who endorses a check that is determined to be forged 
has knowledge of the forged nature of the check and requires an 
explanation on the part of the defendant, all demonstrate that the 
bindover on all counts was appropriate, including the three counts 
taken under advisement by this Court following oral argument. 
The Motion to Quash the Bindover is denied for the reasons 
above-stated. 
Counsel for the State should prepare an appropriate Order 
setting forth the basis upon which the Motion to Quash the Bindover 
is denied, and submit the same to the Court for review and 
signature* 
STATE V. MATTICE PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court sets this matter for trial/in July 20, 1999, and the 
matter will proceed to trial, all in accordance with that setting 
and on all counts in the Informatioi 
Dated this // dav of May, 1^99. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE" 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
HOWARD R. LEMCKE, 3729 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone. (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 






Case No. 981917762FS 
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the parties in the above-entitled action came before this 
Court on April 30, 1999, to consider the Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover. The Defendant 
was before the Court on four counts of Forgery, Third Degree Felonies, having been bound over 
for trial on February 5, 1999, by the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis sitting s Magistrate. Defendant 
moved to quash the bindover, both sides submitted written memorandum and case law. The 
Court heard argument from both parties, denied the Defendant's Motion on Count IV and took 
matters of Counts I, H, and HI under advisement. 
On May 11, 1999, the Court by written Memorandum Decision, citing case law submitted 
by the State, including State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985), denied Defendant's Motion 
as to Counts I, n, and DI. 
Tnud .;u' 





IT IS THERTEFORE ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover is 
DENIED. , 
DATED X\ase2£> day of May, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
